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INTEL, LEVERAGING REBATES AND THE GOALS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 
Nicolas PETIT∗ 
Abstract: This paper reviews the 2014 Intel judgment of the General Court of the EU in 
relation to exclusivity rebates given by dominant firms. It distinguishes between the positive 
issue – ie the legal standard currently applicable to the assessment of dominant firms' rebates 
– and the prospective discussion – ie the legal standard that should optimally apply to 
dominant firms’ rebates. On the positive debate, the paper argues that Intel affirms a 
modified per se prohibition rule against dominant firms' exclusivity rebates. The scope of this 
standard is confined to leveraging rebates, and does not cover non-leveraging rebates, which 
must be analysed under the rule of reason. The paper also draws a distinction between 
exclusivity obligations and exclusivity options for which agencies and courts should 
undertake more economic analysis. On the prospective debate, the paper starts from the 
assumption made by several scholars that Intel endorses a non-welfarist view of the goals of 
Article 102 TFEU. With this background, it questions which non-welfarist alternative goal 
can be ascribed to Article 102 TFEU. The paper finds that none of the three classic non-
welfarist goals (ie competitive process, consumer choice and raising rivals' costs) can be 
acclimated in modern EU competition law. 
Keywords: antitrust, competition, abuse of dominance, exclusivity, rebates, law and 
economics.  
As anticipated, the judgment of the General Court (“GC”) of the European Union (“EU”) in 
Intel v Commission (hereafter, “Intel”)1 is generating intense discussion in antitrust journals.2  
In itself, the profusion of essays on Intel is not a surprise.  Given the high stakes involved in 
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abuse of dominance cases, this area of the law is kept under close watch by the antitrust 
industry.3  For right or wrong, every decision, judgment or policy statement related to the 
application Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (“TFEU”) is expected to 
be the game changer.  In the debate, the law of abusive rebates has been particularly 
controversial for rebates constitute a widespread business practice with ambiguous 
anticompetitive effects.4 
The early literature on Intel however displays two original features.  First, some of the Intel 
papers have taken on a somewhat emotional tone, which is uncommon in EU scholarship.  
Second, and more importantly, the EU Commission – the EU body in charge of enforcing 
Article 102 TFEU and of defining abuse of dominance policy – is not united on the reading of 
Intel.  In a recent paper, the Hearing Officer Wouter WILS has “commended” the Intel court 
for its judgment.  On the other hand, Luc PEEPERKORN, a senior policy analyst with the 
Commission has written that the Intel judgment is “wrong”. 5   Though not entirely 
unprecedented in the history of EU competition policy, the fact that the Commission does not 
speak in unison in the public arena is a rare, noteworthy feature. 
Deep down in the raging doctrinal debate, lie two separate but often embroiled issues.  On the 
one hand, a positive law discussion has taken place over the legal standard that does govern 
the assessment of fidelity rebates under Article 102 TFEU after Intel.  This discussion focuses 
on whether the Commission’s “more economic”, effects-based approach articulated in the 
2009 Guidance Paper on enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings (“Guidance Paper”) is good law,6 
or whether the per se prohibition rule set over 30 years ago in Hoffmann-La Roche is the 
applicable standard.7  On the other hand, there is a prospective debate over the legal standard 
that should govern the assessment of fidelity rebates, and more generally of exclusionary 
pricing and non-pricing conduct under Article 102 TFEU.  In the ideal antitrust world, the 
optimal test of abuse should minimise both type II (false acquittals) and type I (false 
convictions) errors, as well as enforcement (agency) and compliance (firm) costs.8 
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Both the positive and the prospective law discussions are distinct, and should not be confused.  
This essay thus disentangles those issues, and reviews them in turn.  On the first one, it 
conveys the argument that Intel retracts from, but does not entirely nullify, the “more 
economic” framework set out by the 2009 Guidance Paper, in particular for the assessment of 
rebates under Article 102 TFEU.  It argues that it is wrong to consider that Intel restates (or 
resets) the test adumbrated in Hoffmann-La Roche for fidelity rebates.  The wording of Intel 
delineates a more sophisticated regime, which consists in subjecting “leveraging” rebates – 
including de jure or de facto “fidelity” or “exclusivity” rebates – to a modified per se 
prohibition rule, and all other types of rebates to the rule of reason.  In short, the post-Intel 
test is a half-way between Hoffmann-La Roche and the Guidance Paper. 
On the second issue, this essay does not side for one particular standard.  Instead, it explores 
the Intel court’s proposition that the goal of Article 102 TFEU is to ensure the protection of 
“rivals’ access to the market” and of the “freedom of choice” of buyers.  Some early 
discussants have discerned in those statements a blanket repudiation of the “outcome” 
paradigm as a goal of Article 102 TFEU (also known as the “welfarist”, “output” or 
“efficiency” paradigm).9  The reader will recall that the “outcome” paradigm was a salient 
feature of the 2009 Guidance Paper, where the Commission levelled concern at conduct 
giving rise to “consumer harm”.  If this interpretation is correct, a void remains to be filled in 
the goal(s) assigned to Article 102 TFEU.  A non-outcome paradigm ought to be selected and 
explicated, if only to ensure a minimal level of clarity, generality, stability and prospectivity 
in decision making (without which there is no rule of law). 10   The antitrust literature 
traditionally advances three possible alternatives to the “outcome” paradigm, ie the protection 
of the competitive process, of consumer choice, and raising the rivals’ costs theory.  This 
essay considers whether those alternative standards can be acclimated in the EU antitrust 
system.   
The structure of this essay is as follows.  It first recounts the evolution of EU competition 
policy in relation to rebates, up until the adoption of Intel (I).  Readers familiar with the 
history of Article 102 TFEU law can directly head to Section II.  It then argues that the 
positive standard affirmed by the Intel Court is “effects-based” friendly.  At paragraphs 92 
and 93, the judgment explicitly affirms an economic theory of harm as a basis for Article 102 
TFEU liability, namely that dominant firms’ rebates ought to be scrutinized if they generate a 
“leveraging” effect.  However, the Intel court reclined on accepting all the operational 
consequences of this, by adding disconcertingly that the Commission should not scrutinize the 
economic context of dominant firms’ rebates (II).  Finally, the paper contends that it would 
help all stakeholders, and in the first place the Commission, the national competition 
agencies, the General Court and the national courts – who are in the driving seat of 
competition enforcement – to benefit from a clear dicta of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(“CJEU”) on the rationale underpinning the Article 102 TFEU prohibition, in so far as 
exclusionary conduct is concerned.  The Court already sought to advance on this complex 
journey in Post Danmark which, despite the many questions it raised, market a great 
improvement in terms of judicial clarity and literacy.  Future cases – and in particular the 
pending appeal of the GC Intel judgment before the CJEU – offer a welcome opportunity to 
settle once and for all the current purposivist controversy, or whatever other label is used.  
This essay advances some ideas to that end (III).   
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A. INTEL IN CONTEXT 
1. THE INTEL JUDGMENT 
In 2009, the Commission found Intel Corp. (“Intel”), a leading US manufacturer of central 
processing units (“CPUs”), guilty of abuse of dominance.11  The Commission inflicted on 
Intel a €1,06 billion fine, the highest penalty ever imposed in Europe in a single firm conduct 
cases.  The Commission’s theory of harm was that Intel had offered financial incentives to 
customers with a view to defeat the rapid expansion of its main rival AMD in the market for 
x86 CPU microprocessors (“x86 CPUs”).  In the early 2000s, AMD had started to roll out a 
new suite of CPUs running at speeds in excess of 1GHz and based on a drastically novel 
design, the 64 bit architecture.  AMDs’ new CPUs directly threatened Intel’s market 
leadership.  Stuck in a process of Moore’s law incremental innovation, Intel retaliated on the 
money front, granting rebates to computer manufacturers (“OEMs”) such as Dell, HP, Lenovo 
and NEC on the condition that they would purchase all or almost all of their x86 CPUs from 
Intel.  Intel also awarded payments to a large retailer, MSH in exchange for MSH selling 
exclusively computers containing Intel’s x86 CPUs.12   
The Commission considered the rebates granted to the OEMs and MSH to be “de facto 
conditional”.  By “de facto” conditionality, the Commission meant that there was not a clear 
contractual exclusivity provision, but that under the contracts, Intel’s customers entertained 
financial advantages in exchange for purchasing all or most of their CPU requirements with 
Intel.  Paragraph 201 of the Commission’s decision offers a graphic description of those 
contractual incentives:  
 “Dell negotiated with Intel that a small portion of the MCP discount could vary based on 
Dell's success in meeting specific criteria negotiated on a quarterly basis. This portion of the 
MCP discount was known as [...]MCP ('[...]'), and related to [...] of Dell's total spend (…) It 
could potentially fall to [...] or rise to [...] depending on Dell's performance against the 
negotiated criteria (emphasis added)”.13 
The Commission held that absent any objective justification, such rebates were abusive.14  It 
additionally conducted a 151 pages comprehensive economic analysis of the anticompetitive 
impact of Intel’s rebates.  Early commentators interpreted this analysis as a first practical try 
at what would later be labelled the “more economic” approach to Article 102 TFEU enshrined 
in the 2009 Guidance Paper.15 
Intel appealed the Commission’s decision before the General Court.  Its pleadings focused on 
two legal points that are summarized at paragraph 70 of the judgment.  First, Intel argued that 
in rebates cases, the Commission should have reviewed “all the surrounding circumstances” 
of the case to find competitive harm.16  With this, Intel sought to secure the Court’s backing 
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that the Commission had a duty to perform an economic assessment of the context and impact 
of the rebates, as a prior to challenging the factual foundations of the Commission’s decision.   
Second, Intel argued that where conduct is “historic”, the agency should have reviewed 
available market data so as to verify allegations of anticompetitive foreclosure.  On the facts, 
Intel claimed that the Commission had failed to scrutinize empirical market information.  
Devoid of this analysis, it decision had arguably not established that foreclosure had 
“actually” occurred in the market.17 
The Intel Court disposed of both arguments.  It first set that rebates “conditional on exclusive 
supply” or “on the customer’s obtaining most of its requirements” constitute “exclusivity 
rebates”.18  Recalling paragraph 90 of the 1979 Hoffmann-La Roche CJEU judgment, the 
General Court went on to state that such rebates “are designed to remove or restrict the 
purchaser’s freedom to choose his sources of supply and to deny other producers access to 
the market”.  Accordingly, save an objective justification, “exclusivity rebates” are per se 
abusive, and there is no need to bring “proof of a capacity to restrict competition depending 
on the circumstances of the case”.19  Intel’s rebates fell squarely within this category, and the 
Commission was right to declare them unlawful.20 
The General Court added that the Commission had no obligation to review the “surrounding 
circumstances” as advanced by the applicant.  According to the Court, the test set in Michelin 
I and British Airways whereby the Commission must review “all the circumstances” of the 
case applies to “other rebate systems”, i.e. rebates “where the grant of a financial incentive is 
not directly linked to a condition of exclusive or quasi-exclusive supply […], but where the 
mechanism for granting the rebate may also have a fidelity-building effect”.21  To put it 
another way, where the rebate is not contingent on a specific purchasing behaviour on the part 
of the customer – for instance, it is linked to a sales target – “surrounding circumstances” 
matter.  
Finally, the Intel Court logically disposed of the second argument of the applicant.  Given the 
strict per se prohibition rule, effects do not matter in “exclusivity rebates” cases.22  Cases of 
“historic” exclusivity rebates thus do not deserve to be treated distinctly from cases of 
incipient, nascent or deficient conduct.  The Commission was under no duty to carry out a 
concrete analysis of the actual effects of Intel’s rebates in the market.  With this, the General 
Court dismissed all of Intel’s substantive grounds of appeal, and confirmed the Commission’s 
decision in its entirety.   
Besides the outcome of the case, an unprecedented feature of Intel is that it orderly delineates 
a typology of rebates under Article 102 TFEU.23  In the first category, “quantity rebates” are 
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“generally considered” not to yield the kind of foreclosure effect prohibited by Article 102 
TFEU.  They “reflect gains in efficiency and economies of scale” of the dominant firm, and 
are thus subject to a per se legality standard.24  A second category are “exclusivity” rebates 
linked to a condition of exclusive or quasi exclusive supply.  Under the Hoffmann-La Roche 
precedent, those rebates are presumably unlawful, save in “exceptional circumstances”.25  In 
its pleadings, the Commission had labelled them “fidelity rebates” (so had the Court in 
Hoffmann-La Roche).  The Court refers instead to “exclusivity rebates”, in a possible 
rhetorical attempt to emphasize their inherently problematic nature.  The Court’s 
pronouncements on this second category are those that have spurred scholarly debate.  The 
third category comprises rebates that are “not directly linked to a condition of exclusive or 
quasi-exclusive supply”, such as rebates conditioned on sales targets.  They are subject to a 
rule of reason analysis.  The Court says that it is necessary to “consider all the circumstances” 
surrounding those rebates.26 
2. INTEL’S PLACE IN THE CASE-LAW 
The Intel judgment has a number of fundamental legal features that can only be properly 
understood in context.  As it stands, it is the latest application of a decades-old case-law 
precedent set in Hoffman-La Roche, where the Court affirmed a strict per se prohibition rule 
against “fidelity” rebates.  This case-law emboldened the Commission.  A boatload of 
dominant firms’ rebates schemes were subsequently investigated, enjoined and litigated.  This 
paved the way to the formation of a rich body of EU courts’ precedents.  In this section, we 
sift through this case-law. 
In Michelin I, the dominant tire manufacturer Michelin had granted sales target rebates to 
dealers.27   The Commission and the Court considered this rebate scheme abusive.  Both 
criticized the individualised, opaque and retroactive nature of Michelin’s rebates.  With such 
features, the impugned rebate scheme heightened the pressure on dealers to expand their 
purchases with Michelin, and in turn foreclosed rival tire manufacturers.  Importantly, the 
Court suggested somewhat confusingly that the per se prohibition rule was not to be applied 
blindly noting that “It is necessary to consider all the circumstances, particularly the criteria 
and rules for the grant of the discount, and to investigate whether, in providing an advantage 
not based on any economic service justifying it, the discount tends to remove or restrict the 
buyers ' freedom to choose his sources of supply”.28 
BPB was about a dominant producer of plaster boards, BG, who had offered to cover the 
promotional and advertising expenses of its customers, in exchange for exclusivity.29  Citing 
to Michelin I as precedent, the Commission and the Court found that BG had unlawfully 
given financial advantages in order to prevent its customers from dealing with rivals.  This 
was, in and of itself, akin to unlawful abuse under Article 102 TFEU.30 
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In Michelin II, 31  Michelin had rolled out a system of “progress bonus” which awarded 
financial advantages to dealers that would increase tire purchases as compared to the previous 
year.32  Unlike in Michelin I, the impugned rebates were not individualised, but standardised. 
And there was no exclusivity requirement.  This notwithstanding, the General Court 
considered that in view of their “loyalty inducing” nature, those rebates could be deemed 
abusive. 
In British Airways,33 a dominant airline had awarded performance bonuses to travel agents.  
The Commission and the EU Courts found them abusive. The bonuses in question were 
retroactive and based on individualised and progressive sales targets.  Given the “unavoidable 
business partner” position of British Airways, the bonuses generated a fidelity-building effect 
which prevented travel agents to buy tickets from rival airlines (such as Virgin Airways).34 
Tomra was about agreements between a dominant producer of machines that collect used 
beverage containers and retail outlets (eg, supermarkets). 35   The impugned contracts 
contained exclusivity and preferred supplier clauses, quantity commitments corresponding to 
de facto total or partial exclusivity, as well fidelity rebates subject to volume thresholds.  The 
Commission found the agreements overall abusive.  In relation to Tomra’s rebates, the 
Commission carried out a price-cost analysis which elicited exclusionary effects.  This 
constituted the first decisional application of the methodology formulated in the 2009 
Guidance Paper.36  On appeal, the Court of Justice of the EU dispensed the Commission from 
such evidentiary hurdles.  It maintained that a qualitative approach sufficed to establish 
abuse. 37   And like in Michelin I, the Court somewhat relaxed the Hoffmann-La Roche 
precedent noting that rebates had to be assessed in the light of “all the circumstances, 
particularly the criteria and rules governing the grant of the rebate”.38  Lastly, Tomra is also 
the case that controversially stated that fidelity rebates are abusive regardless of their market 
coverage.39 
Besides this long record of prohibition cases, the recent case-law also embodies occasional 
failures to prosecute dominant firms’ rebates.  In Velux40, the Commission abandoned an 
investigation against a dominant roof windows producer who had granted discounts to its 
distributors.  Like in Tomra – of which Velux is contemporary – the Commission approached 
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the case with a price-cost analysis.  This time, however, it reached the conclusion that the 
incremental rebates under scrutiny exerted no anticompetitive foreclosure effects.41   
In Euronext, the Commission’s initial concerns were that a dominant equity trading platform 
had introduced rebates on the original fee schedule applied to liquidity providers (brokers 
working for large investment banks) in response to the entry of the London Stock Exchange 
(“LSE”) on the market.  Little information filtered on this case.  However, Commission 
officials reported that the investigation had been closed short of evidence that the investigated 
rebates were retroactive or that they were individually targeted.42   
3. SUMMATION 
Until Intel, the case-law on fidelity rebates exhibited two notable features.  First, “fidelity” 
rebates were subject to a per se prohibition rule, with the somewhat confusing ambiguity 
introduced in Michelin I that “all the circumstances” were relevant in the assessment.  On 
cursory analysis, Intel rationalizes the standard.  Fidelity rebates are per se prohibited, period.  
The sole manifest modification brought by the judgment lies in the epithet.  The GC 
substitutes the expression “fidelity rebates” with “exclusivity rebates”.   
The rationale behind this strict prohibition standard is discussed in the scholarship.43  Pablo 
IBAÑEZ advances that the case-law deems fidelity rebates per se abusive because it considers 
that they are driven by anticompetitive intent.44   Hence the reason for a severe liability 
standard, and a light evidentiary regime.  This reading finds comfort in the English version of 
paragraph 90 of Hoffmann-La Roche where it is written that such rebates “are designed to 
deprive the purchaser of or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other 
producers access to the market (emphasis added)”.  It is also consistent with the line of case-
law that reputes exclusive dealing or other types of dominant firm conduct as abusive, absent 
an objective justification.45 
Alberto HEIMLER has proposed a distinct interpretation.  In his view, the Court 
presumptively posits that contractual (or non-contractual) exclusivity will generate 
exclusionary effects, though it is unclear on which economic theory of probability this 
reasoning is based.  HEIMLER captured this with a telling metaphor, writing that the EU 
Courts’ approach to fidelity rebates is akin to “banning the sale of Ferrari cars, because it is 
highly probable that drivers will not respect the speed limits”. 46   
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 A. HEIMLER, “Pricing below costs and loyalty discounts: are they restrictive and if so, when?” (2005) 1 
Competition Policy International, 149. 
 9
In our view, HEIMLER’s reading is more convincing.  The French speaking version of 
paragraph 90 of the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment clearly looks at a probabilistic effects 
standard, and not at an intent-one.  It notes that fidelity rebates “tend to deprive the purchaser 
of, or restrict his possible choices of sources of supply and to deny other producers access to 
the market (emphasis added)”.47   
Admittedly, the French speaking version of Hoffmann-La Roche should not be given more 
relevance than the English one.  But, as readers familiar from EU law know, French is the 
language in which the EU judges work and decide cases.  It is thus an accepted custom in EU 
legal scholarship to give authority to the French-speaking versions of judgments, when 
linguistic inconsistencies arise.48  More importantly, this interpretation is the sole reconcilable 
with subsequent paragraphs of the Hoffmann-La Roche judgment, and in particular with 
paragraph 91.  The Court defines there the notion of abuse in principled terms, and vindicates 
an effects-based standard: “the concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the 
behaviour of an undertaking in a dominant position which … has the effect of hindering the 
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition (emphasis added)”.49 
A second lesson to draw from the pre-Intel case-law is that – with the possible exception of 
Velux – most fidelity rebates cases have been dealt with under a qualitative analytical 
framework.  This can be observed at two levels.  On the one hand, when exclusivity is not 
formulated as an explicit contractual condition for the rebate (de jure exclusivity), the Court 
has accepted that the agency establishes that the financial incentives granted by the dominant 
firm are de facto conducive to exclusivity, ie they induce the customer to purchase all or 
almost all its requirements from a dominant supplier.  In the case-law, de facto exclusivity has 
often been established by looking at the design of the rebates systems.  On this, Intel seems to 
set an even lower standard, retaining a sort of ‘you know it when you see it’ rule to 
characterize exclusivity.  On the other hand, the case-law has paid little attention to the proof 
(or lack thereof) of actual or potential effects exclusionary effects.  Here, Intel holds the line.  
The test of anticompetitive exclusion applicable to rebates cases, in particular those falling in 
the third category, remains largely abstract and vague. 
  
                                                          
47
 To make things clear, the writer of this essay is French-speaking by mother tongue. 
48
 This is not a rare feature in the EU legal order 
49
 Hoffmann-La Roche judgment, at note 7, paragraph 91. 
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Type of rebate Test in Guidance Paper  Test in Intel  
Quantity rebate systems (§75) Per se legality Per se legality (refers to Michelin II) 
Fidelity “Exclusivity” rebates 
(§76) 
Rule of reason (implied 
predation + objective 
justification) 
Per se illegality (refers to 
Hoffmann-La Roche) 
Rebates not linked to a condition 
of exclusive or quasi exclusive 
supply (§78) => individual sales 
targets 
Rule of reason (implied 
predation + objective 
justification) 
Rule of reason (“consider all the 
circumstances” refers to 
Michelin I) 
 
B. INTEL AND LEVERAGING REBATES 
A first reading of Intel invites the conclusion that the General Court perpetuated the per se 
prohibition rule of “fidelity” rebates set in Hoffmann-La Roche.  This rendition is, however, 
both incomplete and incorrect.  Intel brings two crucial modifications to the per se prohibition 
regime inherited from Hoffmann-La Roche.  First, it clarifies that an economic theory of harm 
underpins the prohibition of dominant firms’ rebates (A).  This theory is the leveraging 
scenario that already appeared in several sections of the Guidance Paper, and especially in the 
section devoted to “conditional rebates”.  Those statements are not without consequences on 
the positive legal standard applicable to exclusivity rebates.  They mean that the scope of the 
per se prohibition reaffirmed in Intel only covers a narrow subset of exclusivity rebates, ie 
leveraging rebates (B).  Second, despite the fact that Intel had raised no efficiency defense in 
its appeal, the Intel Court ruled on its own motion, and with principled terms, that dominant 
firms’ rebates can be redeemed by efficiency benefits (C).  The result of all this is that the 
positive legal standard applicable to fidelity rebates following Intel is not a strict per se 
prohibition rule, as aired in early scholarship, but a modified per se prohibition rule (D). 
1. INTEL AND THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF ANTICOMPETITIVE LEVERAGING  
It is not uncommon for the EU courts to explain the rationale underpinning key provisions of 
the Treaties.  In the competition field, many judgments have explicated the basis for (in 
mundane terms the “why” of) antitrust liability.  Airtours, on coordinated effects,50  Post 
Danmark on limit pricing,51 or Groupement des Cartes Bancaires on two-sided markets are 
cases in point.52 
Intel is of the same craft.  It marks an important evolution in relation to exclusivity rebates.  
Paragraphs 92-93 of the judgment make abundantly explicit that an economic theory of harm 
underscores the prohibition of exclusivity rebates.  We reproduce in full those important and 
                                                          
50
 Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585. 
51
 Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:172. 
52
 Case C-67/13 P Groupement des cartes bancaires (CB) v Commission [2014], ECLI:EU:C:2014:2204. 
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often overlooked paragraphs: 
“It follows from the position of unavoidable trading partner that customers will in any event obtain part 
of their requirements from the undertaking in a dominant position (‘the non-contestable share’). The 
competitor of an undertaking in a dominant position is not therefore in a position to compete for the full 
supply of a customer, but only for the portion of the demand exceeding the non-contestable share (‘the 
contestable share’). The contestable share is thus the portion of a customer’s requirements which can 
realistically be switched to a competitor of the undertaking in a dominant position in any given period, 
as the Commission states at recital 1009 of the contested decision. The grant of exclusivity rebates by 
an undertaking in a dominant position makes it more difficult for a competitor to supply its own goods 
to customers of that dominant undertaking. If a customer of the undertaking in a dominant position 
obtains supplies from a competitor by failing to comply with the exclusivity or quasi-exclusivity 
condition, it risks losing not only the rebates for the units that it switched to that competitor, but the 
entire exclusivity rebate. 
In order to submit an attractive offer, it is not therefore sufficient for the competitor of an undertaking 
in a dominant position to offer attractive conditions for the units that that competitor can itself supply to 
the customer; it must also offer that customer compensation for the loss of the exclusivity rebate. In 
order to submit an attractive offer, the competitor must therefore apportion the rebate that the 
undertaking in a dominant position grants in respect of all or almost all of the customer’s requirements, 
including the non-contestable share, to the contestable share alone. Thus, the grant of an exclusivity 
rebate by an unavoidable trading partner makes it structurally more difficult for a competitor to submit 
an offer at an attractive price and thus gain access to the market. The grant of exclusivity rebates 
enables the undertaking in a dominant position to use its economic power on the non-contestable share 
of the demand of the customer as leverage to secure also the contestable share, thus making access to 
the market more difficult for a competitor”. 
Anybody with antitrust background will recognize instantly and correctly in those paragraphs 
the classic theory of anticompetitive leveraging.  The theory rests on the premise that in a 
market with a dominant firm, a share of the demand of each customer is inelastic.53  In other 
words, each customer reserves a fixed proportion of its requirements to the dominant firm.54  
In principle, the dominant firm can charge the monopoly price on this inelastic share of 
customer demand.  The Intel court talks of the “non-contestable” share of customer demand.  
But the dominant firm may prefer to strategically leverage the non-contestable share of 
customer demand towards the “contestable share” of customer demand, so as to exclude 
fringe rivals and subsequently apply the monopoly price on larger quantities.  To that end, the 
dominant firm will offer discounts on the non-contestable share in exchange for 
supplementary purchases in the contestable share.  With this, the dominant firm progressively 
devours the contestable share of demand on which fringe rivals compete.  Conceptually, this 
theory – we call it the “leveraging rebates” theory – is close from the theories of harm used in 
tying cases, with the sole difference that it takes place on a single product.55 
A short numerical example helps understand how leveraging rebates work in practice.  Let us 
assume that firm A is dominant in the market for widgets.  All customers source 70% of their 
products with firm A while firm B provides the remainder.  A and B both sell for 10€ per unit, 
and incur an average cost of 5€ per unit.  A wants to capture the 30% of demand currently 
served by B.  It introduces the following rebate scheme: any customer that places more than 
70% of its orders with A will receive a price of 5€ per unit on all purchases.  If customer X 
takes all of its requirements (100 units) with A, he will pay 500€ to A, that is 5 € per unit.  To 
                                                          
53
 Where customers could in theory multi-source. 
54
 In practice, a proxy for the calculation of the non-contestable share is the market share held by the dominant 
firm.   
55
 So it escapes the single monopoly profit critique advanced by the Chicago school. 
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keep serving X, B who is as efficient, could slash its prices to 5€ per unit.  But this would not 
be sufficient to convince X to stay with B.  Indeed, in this variant, X would pay 10€x70 to A 
and 5€x30 to B, that is 850€ in total.  If firm B wants to compete for the 30% of X, it must not 
only offer 30 at 5€, but also compensate loss of 5€ on 70, ie 350€.  To meet competition, B 
would have to effectively price as low as 30x5€ - 350€ = -200€.  In other words, to stay in 
business, B would have to charge negative prices, that is to give 2€ per widget, to X. 
 
Figure 1 – Leveraging Rebates, Graphical Representation 
The theory that leveraging rebates can yield anticompetitive exclusionary effects is based on 
several restrictive assumptions.56  One of them is that the rebate is applied to all customers in 
the market (or that X represents the entirety of market demand).  However, if X is the only 
customer to enjoy the rebate in a market with 100 customers with equal requirements, then B 
can recoup the lost 200€ on 99 other customers.  In this context, B will remain able to price 
compete with A at 6.98€ per unit, which is well below the initial 10€ per unit monopoly price.  
The rebate will thus certainly have an “exclusivity” effect with A.  But short of a sufficiently 
large tied share, it will be incapable of exclusionary effects on B.  At this stage, let us note 
that the Intel judgment does not pay much heed to this issue of the tied share, which it seems 
to assume as either large or, more plausibly, as irrelevant.57 
Interestingly paragraphs 92-93 are not inventions of the Intel court.  As said above, they draw 
heavy inspiration from traditional antitrust doctrine (and case-law).  But readers will also 
recognize the language found in the 2009 Guidance Paper, an official agency document which 
ambitioned to bring some degree of legal certainty and economic literacy in single firm 
conduct cases.58  This document explains that the Commission focuses in priority on conduct 
                                                          
56
 Another one is that the rival firm cannot expand output, and challenge the dominant firm on the 70% of the 
requirements.  
57
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 116. 
58
 And bring the law of abuse of dominance in line with other areas of EU competition law (such as verticals 
agreements and mergers).  In 2005, a group of influential academic economists appointed by the Commission 
(the Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy, “EAGCP”) suggested to modernize the approach 
inherited from the early Court case-law on abuse, and to undertake a real “verification of competitive harm” in 
abuse cases pursuant to an effects-based approach.  More generally, the report proposed to use economics in a 
normative manner, with a view to defining legal tests for main categories of unlawful abuses.  This suggestion 
paved the way to the adoption of a Commission Discussion Paper on 2009 which explicited substantive tests of 
abuse that were both consistent with existing case-law and inspired from modern industrial economics.  The 
Discussion Paper was widely discussed in the competition community.  In parallel, the Commission “tried” the 
effects-based approach in three abuse of dominance cases (i.e. the Wanadoo, Microsoft I and Telefónica cases). 
See http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html (accessed 11 May 2015). Commission Decision of 
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that yields actual or potential anticompetitive foreclosure outcomes.59  At the same time, it 
formalizes an effects-based method for the assessment of unilateral practices under Article 
102 TFEU.  In a nutshell, this approach consists in laying down a theory of harm, testing it 
with price-costs assessments and counterfactual analysis, and considering efficiency 
defenses.60 
The degree of semantical proximity between Intel and the Guidance Paper is arresting.  
Paragraphs 92-93 of Intel contain wording virtually identical to that used in the section of the 
Guidance Paper specifically devoted to rebates.  Like the Guidance Paper which approached 
rebates as “exclusive purchasing obligations”, Intel talks of “exclusivity rebates”.61  Like the 
Guidance Paper which framed the issue in terms of anticompetitive “leverage”, Intel explains 
that “the dominant firm can use its economic power … as leverage”.62  And like the Guidance 
Paper, Intel describes the mechanics of exclusivity rebates in terms of using the “non-
contestable” portion of demand to capture the “contestable” share of demand.   
Besides this, it is also important to see that the Intel Court speaks the language of mainstream 
antitrust economics.  Intel discusses exclusivity rebates under the umbrella of the classic 
theory of anticompetitive leverage.  The references found in the judgment to tying law make 
this particularly obvious.  On several occasions, the Intel court talks of the “capability of tying 
customers to the undertaking in a dominant position”.63 
Against this backdrop, however, the imports of the Guidance Paper (and of mainstream 
economic theory) remain fractional.  Whilst paragraph 92-93 of Intel explain how leveraging 
rebates can generate exclusivity, they remain mute on the scale of customer exclusivity 
necessary to yield competitor exclusion.  On this, the Guidance paper stressed the necessity to 
review other factors,64 including the “position of the dominant undertaking”, “conditions on 
the relevant market”, “position of the dominant undertaking’s competitors”, “position of 
customers or input suppliers”, “extent of the allegedly abusive conduct”, “possible evidence of 
actual foreclosure”, “direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy”.65  Put differently, the 
Guidance Paper requires not only the proof of an exclusivity effect, but also of an 
exclusionary effect.66  In its decision, the Commission had established that the market share 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
16 july 2003, COMP/38.233 – Wanadoo Interactive; Commission Decision of 24 March 2004, COMP/C-
3/37.792 Microsoft; Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, COMP/38.784 – Wanadoo España v. Telefónica. 
Finally, the Commission adopted a Guidance Paper.  The Guidance Paper marks a compromise between the 
Directorate General for Competition (“DG COMP”) of the Commission, which initially pushed for the adoption 
of formal Guidelines on exclusionary abuses, and its Legal Service, intent on keeping a certain margin of 
maneuver before the Union courts. 
59
 Abuse occurs if there is actual or likely elimination of an as efficient rival.   
60 In the words of former Director General LOWE: “The Commission now uses an ‘effects-based approach’ [...] 
which focuses on the actual and likely effects on consumer welfare. This means that a framework is needed to 
establish a theory of consumer harm, and this framework should also come up with hypotheses which can be 
tested (emphasis added)”. See P. Lowe, “The Design of Competition Policy Institutions for the 21st Century — 
The Experience of the European Commission and DG Competition”, Competition Policy Newsletter, 2008 – 
Number 3. 
61




 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 86. 
64
 Guidance paper, supra note 6, at paragraph 38. 
65
 Guidance paper, supra note 6, at paragraph 20. 
66
 If the core purpose of Article 102 TFEU is to prevent anticompetitive outcomes, this makes perfect economic 
sense.  As explained previously, if the exclusivity rebate covers only 1% of market demand, as efficient rivals 
can keep competing to a certain extent with the dominant firm. 
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tied by the fidelity rebates was significant, so that rivals were excluded from the market.67  
The Intel court refused, however, to follow this path.  Though it recognizes anticompetitive 
leverage as the engine of customer exclusivity, the judgment finds it unnecessary to condition 
findings of abuse to proof of exclusion.  At paragraph 80, it affirms that “the question whether 
an exclusivity rebate can be categorized as abusive does not depend on an analysis of the 
circumstances of the case aimed at establishing potential foreclosure effects”.68  At paragraph 
85, it holds again that “exclusivity rebates … are by their very nature capable of restricting 
competition”.69  This means that once exclusivity rebates are detected, it is moot to “assess 
their effects on the market in their specific context”.70  And this conflates exclusivity and 
exclusion for the purposes of applying Article 102 TFEU.  Hammering out the consequences 
of this, the Intel court recapitulates: “the possible smallness of the parts of the market which 
are concerned by the practices at issue is not a relevant argument”,71 and proof of significant 
foreclosure is not “a necessary condition”.72  
The Intel judgment is also not entirely aligned with the Guidance Paper on the first step of the 
analysis, which is the characterization of exclusivity.  To understand this, we would like to 
introduce a key distinction, that between exclusivity obligations and exclusivity options.  On 
the one hand, there are exclusivity obligations:  X commits under the contract to buy 
exclusively (or to buy 100%) from A.  On the other hand, there are exclusivity options – if X 
buys exclusively (or 100%) from A, it will receive a financial or non-financial bonus.  
Exclusivity obligations can be unilateral – X commits under the contract to buy exclusively 
(or to buy 100%) from A – or reciprocal – X commits under the contract to buy exclusively 
(or to buy 100%) from A while A gives a something in exchange (possibly a financial or non-
financial bonus).  Exclusivity obligations can be presumed to generate exclusivity.  
Exclusivity options cannot.  It all depends on what the buyer decides to do.  
Fidelity rebates are exclusivity options.  They cannot be abstractly presumed to generate 
exclusivity.  If A tells X that it will get a rebate of 100€ if it purchases exclusively from it, it 
cannot be assumed that X will procure solely from A.73  It all depends on whether alternative 
suppliers can too give a 100€ rebate on the total price for the 30%.  Similarly, if A tells X that 
it will get a rebate of 0,5€ per unit above 80% of its requirements; of 1€ per unit above 90%; 
and of 1,5€ per unit if it buys 100%, it cannot be conjectured that X will concentrate all or 
most of its purchases with A.74 
The Guidance Paper had understood the distinction between obligations and options, and had 
formulated a simple quantitative method to evidence the exclusivity potential of fidelity 
rebates.  It proposed to apply price-cost tests to calculate the effective price that ought to be 
                                                          
67
 Intel decision, supra note 11 at paragraphs 1577 and following. 
68
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraphs 585 and 586. The Court affirms: “It should be noted that, in order 
to find that the exclusivity rebates were unlawful, the Commission is not required to analyse the capability of 
those practices to restrict competition according to the circumstances of the case at hand (see paragraphs 80 to 
94 above)”. 
69
 And in other paragraphs, the Court states that this is because foreclosure (or exclusion) can be presumed, 
given that such rebates, though they do not render market access impossible, make “access to the market more 
difficult” to competitors. Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 88. 
70
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraphs 89 and 143. 
71
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 116. 
72
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 120. 
73
 This is a de jure fidelity option if this is written in a contract. 
74
 This is a de facto fidelity option if this is written in a contract. 
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matched by rivals.75  This method is the one that had been applied by the Commission in its 
decision. 
In Intel, the Court crimps exclusivity obligations and options in the same box.  It deems that 
any financial incentive is an unlawful “exclusivity rebate” when its grant is “conditional on 
the customer’s obtaining all or most of its requirements” from the dominant firm.  This 
definition is certainly justified on the ground that the dominant firm could otherwise evade the 
strict prohibition of exclusivity obligations by designing an exclusivity option.  In other 
words, the prohibition rule shall not treat obligations and options distinctly, otherwise 
dominant firms could use options in an attempt to avoid the per se prohibition rule on 
exclusivity.76  This is presumably what the GC had in mind when it affirmed that fidelity 
rebates are not a pricing practice.77  Implicit in the GC reasoning is that exclusivity options 
are of the same breed as contractual exclusivity or, more generally, exclusive dealing. 
But it is problematic.  It is bound to capture as per se prohibited exclusivity rebates, options 
with no exclusivity potential.  Let us revert to our numerical example, and think for a minute 
to the absurd example of A giving a 1€ rebate on the total price of widgets if X purchases 
100% from it.  This should be categorized as an exclusivity rebate under Intel’s wisdom.  
However, the effective price that B will have to meet to compete with A will be 9,9€.  With a 
cost per unit of 5€, B remains perfectly apt to serve X, and exclusivity cannot be presumed.  
The impropriety of the confusion between obligation and options is further compounded by 
the fact that the Intel court does not specify what “all or most” means. With all this, it appears 
difficult to maintain that the Intel court abrogates the Guidance Paper.  Rather, it is quite clear 
that Intel ratifies the Guidance Paper reasoning.78 At the same time, however, it does not draw 
all the operational consequences from it. This is a little confusing. 
2. NON-LEVERAGING REBATES AND THE RULE OF REASON  
The judicial recognition of the theory of leveraging as the lynchpin for the prohibition of 
certain dominant firms’ rebates brings a crucial limitation to the scope of the per se 
prohibition rule on exclusivity rebates: non-leveraging rebates escape the per se prohibition 
rule applicable to rebates of the second category. 
Let us unwrap again the Intel’s court operative reasoning.  Exclusivity rebates are subject to a 
strict per se prohibition rule.79  This is because the dominant firm can maneuver the “non 
contestable share” of demand as leverage to capture the “contestable share”.  Rivals willing 
to compete do not stand a chance to behave equally – they do not enjoy a non-contestable 
share.  They must therefore offer “compensation for the loss of exclusivity rebate” on the 
contestable share.  This arguably makes their life “more difficult”, and is a cause of antitrust 
concern.  Leveraging rebates, those granted on the contestable share, plus on all or part (“all 
or most” says the Court) of the non-contestable share shall hence be deemed per se unlawful.  
                                                          
75
 The Guidance paper proposed to impute the amount rebated on the non-contestable share to the contestable 
share. 
76
 I am grateful to R. Whish for pointing this argument to my attention. 
77Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 99.  
78
 Guidance paper, supra note 6, at paragraphs 37-45. 
79
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 93 and 178. 
 16 
And the implicit corollary of this is an admission that rebates that do not operate through a 
leveraging effect are of less concern, and shall be removed from the per se prohibition rule.  
In all logic, the standard that ought to apply to them should be the next less strict standard, ie 
the rule of reason analysis applicable to rebates of the third category.  For those rebates, it is 
“necessary to consider all the circumstances”.80 
In practice, this is no little finding.  Dominant firms are not per se barred from granting 
rebates on the contestable share of demand.  What is per se forbidden is to grant rebates on 
the contestable units, plus on some or all of the non-contestable quantities.  As a rule of 
thumb, the non-contestable share can be approximated to the dominant firm’s market share.  
If we re-use our example, firm A is not per se barred from granting a rebate to X on the 30% 
open to competition (for instance, X receives a 10% rebate on all quantities exceeding 75% of 
its requirements).  However, A is per se banned from offering a rebate that covers the 30% 
open to competition plus a share of the 70% not open to competition.81   
The difference between leveraging and non-leveraging rebates mimics the Guidance Paper’s 
distinction between retroactive rebates and incremental rebates.82  Whichever may be the right 
qualification, the per se prohibition rule against exclusivity rebates defined in Intel targets 
leveraging rebates.  And with this definition, the Intel Court has rejected non-leveraging 
rebates in the rule of reason box (third category).  This mitigates early concerns that dominant 
firms active in the EU are no longer free to price compete.  As long as they stay within the 
limits of the contestable share, they can price compete.83  
Type of rebate Test in Guidance Paper Test in Intel 
Quantity rebate systems (§75) Per se legality  Per se legality (Michelin II) 
Leveraging rebates (§76) Rule of reason (quantitative 
price test + objective 
justification) 
Per se illegality (Hoffmann-La 
Roche) 
Non-leveraging rebates Rule of reason (quantitative 
price test + objective 
justification) 
Rule of reason 
                                                          
80
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 78 which deems necessary “to consider all the circumstances, […] 
and to investigate whether, [...], that rebate tends to remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom to choose his 
sources of supply, to bar competitors from access to the market, or to strengthen the dominant position by 
distorting competition”. 
81
 On paper, this principle seems easy to apply, but it may be very complex for dominant firms to implement it in 
practice.   
82
 Guidance paper, supra note 6, at paragraph 40.  A rebate is “retroactive” when the price concession is granted 
on all purchases during a defined period, including those below the specified threshold(s). It is “incremental” 
when the price concession benefits to purchases above the threshold(s).  The Guidance paper suggests to 
administer complex price-costs tests to establish anticompetitive foreclosure.  It stresses that anticompetitive 
foreclosure is more likely and acute where the conditional rebate is retroactive.  The Guidance Paper distinction 
is not bullet proof, because some incremental rebates can generate leveraging, if the threshold for the grant of the 
rebate is specified at a level inferior to the dominant firm market share. 
83
 This makes perfect sense, because a rebate in the contestable share of a dominated market will not cover “all 
or most” of customers’ purchases, in the sense of the definition of the Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 
76. 
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Rebates not linked to a 
condition of exclusive or quasi 
exclusive supply (§78) => 
individual sales targets 
Rule of reason (quantitative 
price test + objective 
justification) 
Rule of reason (“consider all the 
circumstances” Michelin I) 
 
C. JUSTIFIABILITY DEFENCE AND THE MODIFIED PER SE PROHIBITION OF LEVERAGING 
REBATES 
The perception that Intel embodies a per se prohibition rule against fidelity rebates is 
additionally discredited by paragraph 94 of the judgment, which articulates a justifiability 
defence for exclusivity rebates.  It is said there that dominant firms can: 
“justify the use of an exclusivity rebate system, in particular by showing that its conduct is 
objectively necessary or that the potential foreclosure effect that it brings about may be 
counterbalanced, outweighed even, by advantages in terms of efficiency that also benefit 
consumers” 
In other words, efficient exclusion exists. 
Again, this idea does not significantly move existing law.  Under the Guidance Paper,84 and 
the Post Danmark case-law of the CJEU,85 dominant firms could already attempt to justify 
exclusionary conduct, and redeem it from Article 102 TFEU liability. 86   Even before, 
Hoffmann-La Roche87 envisioned an integrated Article 102 TFEU defence with a (somewhat 
ambiguous) reference to Article 101(3) TFEU.88   
What is remarkable, however, is that Intel affirms this derogation for the first time in the 
context of appeals proceedings.  Moreover, the Court’s statement reads like obiter dicta.  Intel 
had indeed not put forward any such defence in its appeal.89  
The legal test thus applicable to exclusivity rebates comes nowhere close to a per se 
prohibition rule.  Surely, as soon as leveraging rebates are identified, liability is presumed.  
But this is not the end of the story.  The burden of proof is then deflected on the dominant 
firm, which can put forward economic efficiencies90 or objective necessities91 to justify its 
                                                          
84
 See Guidance paper, supra note 6, at paragraphs 28-31 and §46 in relation to rebates. 
85
 Post Danmark judgment, supra note 51, at paragraphs 40-2. 
86
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at para. 81. 
87
 Hoffmann-La Roche judgment, supra note 7, at para. 90 
88
 Article 101(3) exempts pro-competitive coordination from liability. 
89
 This can be explained by the fact that Intel denied the very existence of exclusivity in the first place, so 
pleading a justification for exclusivity would have been a strange, paradoxical legal strategy. Moreover, it is 
reasonable to think that if the Commission chose to apply a strict per se or quasi per se prohibition standard 
during the investigation, in line with the Hoffmann-La Roche precedent, this left no room to Intel to plead 
efficiencies.  
90
 Here is an example of an efficiency benefit. Let us imagine that the rebate granted to X brings about an 
additional increase in efficiency for A, so that its average production cost falls to 4€/unit.  The rebate brings 
about efficiency that did not exist before.  Assuming that B was an as efficient rival pre-rebate (at 5€/unit), this 
would not prevent to find the rebate efficiency enhancing 
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conduct. With all this, the Intel liability standard can be better classified as a modified per se 
prohibition rule. 
The concrete application of the justifiability defense could, however, be problematical.  The 
reason for this is self-evident.  Under Intel, the anticompetitive effects of leveraging rebates 
are presumed.  Agencies and or complainants before courts do not need to substantiate claims 
of abuse with estimates of harm to competition.  But how can the dominant firm then 
effectively invoke efficiencies that “counterbalanc[e]” or even “outweig[h]” the 
anticompetitive harm caused by its leveraging rebates if it does not know the magnitude of 
those effects in the first place?  Intel’s modified per se standard implies that dominant firms 
argue efficiencies in the dark.  This asymmetry between the liability and justifiability prongs 
of Article 102 TFEU is even more compounded when, following Intel, most of the 
quantitative benchmarks of possible use to establish liability are declared irrelevant by the 
Court (tied market share, tied customer share, size of rebates).92  
Type of rebate Test in Guidance Paper Test in Intel 
Quantity rebate systems (§75) Per se legality Per se legality (Michelin II) 
Leveraging rebates (§76) Rule of reason (quantitative price 
test + objective justification) 
Modified per se illegality (no 
harm verification + objective 
justification) 
Non-leveraging rebates Rule of reason (quantitative price 
test + objective justification) Rule of reason 
Rebates not linked to a condition 
of exclusive or quasi exclusive 
supply (§78) => individual sales 
targets 
Rule of reason (quantitative price 
tests + objective justification) Rule of reason 
D. POSITIVE LAW IMPLICATIONS 
It is now time to close the positive law discussion.  At this stage, the outstanding question is 
whether the liability regime for leveraging rebates defined in Intel – as well as the 
pronouncements of the Intel court on other types of rebates and on abuse in general – 
constitutes the positive law of Article 102 TFEU that must be applied by the Commission, the 
national agencies and courts in ongoing and future competition cases.  The implicit, related 
question is whether Intel supplants the approach enshrined in the Commission’s Guidance 
Paper.  This issue can be approached from two vantage points: the formal (1) and the 
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 Here is an example of an objective necessity. Let us imagine, for a minute, that X is a new customer of A.  By 
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point of sale infrastructure as well as training costs.  The rebate may be an appropriate means to ensure X fidelity 
to A, and that B does not free ride on A investments. This would fall within the category of an objective 
necessity. 
92
 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 150. For instance, dominant firms’ own costs do not longer 
constitute a relevant benchmark. 
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substantive applicability (2) of the Guidance Paper.   
1. Formal Applicability 
In terms of formal applicability, the Commission’s Guidance Paper remains unscathed by 
Intel.  As is well known, appeals before the General Court are review proceedings.  They are 
time-specific, unlike other judicial remedies like preliminary references before the CJEU.  
One should thus not try to read too much about the Guidance Paper in Intel, which concerns a 
case started in the early 2000, well before the Commission decided to change its Article 102 
TFEU policy in 2009.  And nothing should prevent the Commission from applying its 
Guidance Paper in post-2009 cases.93  The Intel court said just this when it confirmed that the 
“Article 82 Guidance was not applicable in the present case”, thereby implicitly not ruling 
out its applicability for subsequent cases.94 
General principles of EU administrative law could even lend credence to the idea that the 
Commission has a duty to apply its Guidance Paper to post-2009 cases.  The Court has often 
recognized that soft law instruments bind the Commission through a form of “Estoppel”.  
This idea has several possible roots in EU legal theory.  In Dansk Rørindustri and others, the 
Court tied it to the general principle of legitimate expectations.  In relation to “rules of 
conduct designed to produce external effects, as is the case of the Guidelines, which are 
aimed at traders”, it held that:  
“In adopting such rules of conduct and announcing by publishing them that they will 
henceforth apply to the cases to which they relate, the institution in question imposes a limit 
on the exercise of its discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, 
where appropriate, to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or 
the protection of legitimate expectations. It cannot therefore be precluded that, on certain 
conditions and depending on their content, such rules of conduct, which are of general 
application, may produce legal effects”.95 
In Archer Daniels Midlands, the Court followed a different route to affirm the same principle.  
It noted that:  
“Guidelines are capable of producing legal effects. Those effects stem not from an attribute of 
the Guidelines as rules of law in themselves, but from their adoption and publication by the 
Commission”.96 
Whichever the right legal theory may be, the EU Courts seem to attach binding effects to such 
instruments. 97   The Fining Guidelines, the Leniency Notice or the De Minimis 
Communication are all examples of soft law instruments which bind the Commission in its 
enforcement initiatives.  And there is no reason why the Guidance Paper should escape a 
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similar fate.  On its face, the Guidance Paper is a “Communication from the Commission”, 
published in the Official Journal of the EU.  It was adopted following a lenghty consultation 
process on Article 102 TFEU.  And in terms of substance, it goes into a high degree of 
granularity at defining standards of Article 102 TFEU liability. 
That the Guidance Paper explicitly disclaims at paragraph 3 that it “is not intended to 
constitute a statement of the law” or that its title speaks of “enforcement priorities” changes 
nothing to the analysis.  EU practitioners and scholars may be interested to fret on the surreal 
impression left by a Communication that says that it is not a statement of the law, but that at 
the same time spends 27 pages defining structured tests of liability.  But this is irrelevant.  
Like other instruments that convey “rules of practice”, the Guidance Paper binds the 
Commission.  
There is, however, a significant limitation to the Guidance Paper formal applicability.  Its 
binding effect does not cover the national competition agencies and courts.  In Pfleiderer and 
Expedia, the Court clarified that Notices adopted by the Commission exert no binding effect 
on Member States authorities (though they can influence their decisional practice).98  The 
national agencies and courts are thus free to apply whatever Article 102 TFEU doctrine they 
want, though it is clear that they will face difficulty to apply Article 102 TFEU distinctly from 
the Guidance Paper given their duty of convergence under Article 11 of Regulation 1/2003.99 
2. Substantive Applicability 
The formal applicability of the Guidance Paper in positive competition law does not mean 
that the tests of liability it embodies enjoy substantive validity.  In Solvay and British 
Airways, Advocate General KOKOTT made the following important point:  
“even if its administrative practice were to change, the Commission would still have to act 
within the framework prescribed for it by Article [102 TFEU] as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice”.100 
In Post Danmark, the Grand Chamber of the CJEU has already seized the opportunity to 
confirm the general approach of the Guidance Paper.  But the CJEU is yet to rule on the 
compatibility of the novel standards of liability introduced by the Guidance Paper in relation 
to the various categories of abuse.  
Whilst the CJEU is the sole jurisdiction with decisive authority on those issues,101 the Intel 
court has seemed willing to deliver some subliminal hints on the substantive validity of the 
Guidance Paper.  This can be seen in the commencement of the judgment, which starts with a 
section discussing the “legal characterization” of abusive rebates which contains no facts but 
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law.102  This kind of academic presentation is uncommon, if not unprecedented, in review 
judgments of the General Court.  There is therefore a credible point that the Intel court sought 
to convey principled messages on the Guidance Paper substantive applicability in its 
judgment.103   
That the Intel court spoke on the Guidance Paper can thus be safely assumed.  But should we 
listen?  Despite all that has been said above, a word of caution is needed here.  The 
intellectual integrity of the Intel court’s pronouncements on the standard of liability applicable 
to dominant firms’ rebates is questionable.  The section of Intel on the “legal 
characterization” of abusive rebates exhibits a parade of dubious, inconsistent and self-
contradicting references to the CJEU case law on exclusionary abuses.  In essence, the 
General Court seems to follows a referencing pattern which consists in dismissing precedents 
when they are adverse to the defendant, and upholding the same precedents when they are 
supportive of the defendant’s position.  
Take TeliaSonera, a leading CJEU judgment on margin squeeze.104  In its appeal, Intel was 
seeking support in paragraph 28 of TeliaSonera, which states that “to prove an abuse it is 
necessary to prove all the circumstances”.  The GC dismissed the applicability of TeliaSonera 
in the case.  It ruled that TeliaSonera was “limited to pricing practices”.  It was thus 
inapplicable to the case under review, which concerned exclusivity rebates (which the Court 
disputably refuses to categorize as a pricing practice).105  Having read that TeliaSonera is 
irrelevant in the case, one does not expect to see it reappear subsequently in the reasoning.  
This notwithstanding, the Intel court cites to TeliaSonera at paragraph 103 to relieve the 
Commission from the duty to establish that the rebates had “actual effects” on 
competition...106  
The landmark Post Danmark judgment of the Grand Chamber of the CJEU is given a similar 
treat.  Like for TeliaSonera, the Intel court refutes its precedential value on the ground that 
Post Danmark concerned above-cost “pricing practices”.  Intel could thus not seek legal 
shelter in Post Danmark’s rule of reason-inspired wording.107  However, at paragraph 94 of its 
judgment, the Court cites to Post Danmark as precedent to explain that exclusivity rebates can 
be salvaged from prohibition if they yield redeeming efficiency advantages or if they are 
objectively necessary...108  
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 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 99. 
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 Intel judgment, supra note 1, at paragraph 94.  
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This pattern of fallacious interpretations perpetuates with the exclusion of the Tomra 
judgment.  The Intel court spells rightly that Tomra concerned “individualised retroactive 
rebates”, in line with the applicant’s argument.109  But it then qualifies the rebates discussed 
in Tomra as rebates belonging to the “third category”, ie those “where the grant of a financial 
incentive is not directly linked to a condition of exclusive or quasi-exclusive supply”.  Given 
that Intel’s rebates were falling under the second category, the GC thus finds that the Tomra 
standard is inapplicable in Intel.110  But in so doing, it turns a blind eye on the fact that it 
previously cited its own judgment in Tomra to justify the categorization of Intel’s practices as 
second category “exclusivity rebates”…111  
But the flaw in citation is nowhere more clearly displayed than in relation to the Van den 
Bergh Foods judgment.112  This case was about a dominant ice cream supplier that had tied 
retail outlets in Ireland with de facto exclusivity commitments.  The dominant firm had 
offered free freezer cabinets to space constrained retailers, and imposed on them a contractual 
duty to exclusively store its own ice cream within the cabinets.  The Commission and the GC 
established an abuse, on the ground that 40% of the retail outlets were foreclosed by the tie.   
In its appeal, Intel was seeking support in Van den Bergh Foods to claim that the Commission 
should have proved that the tied share was “significant” (in Intel’s computation, it represented 
14%).  The Intel Court stroke the argument down on the ground that the Van den Bergh foods 
judgment “did not concern a practice by which a financial incentive was directly conditional 
on the customer’s obtaining all or most of its requirements from the undertaking in a 
dominant position”.113  The misreading of the Van den Bergh Foods case-law is mesmerizing.  
The GC itself, in the Van den Bergh Foods judgment held at paragraph 159 that the 
“infringement of Article 86 [now Article 102 TFEU] takes the form, in this case, of an offer to 
supply freezer cabinets to the retailers and to maintain the cabinets free of any direct charge 
to the retailers”.  If offering a product for free is not a “financial incentive”, then little green 
men exist.114   
In our view, the truly spectacular number of inconsistencies affecting the Intel judgment’s 
referencing contaminates the credibility of the General Court’s pronouncements.  Unfortunate 
as this may be – especially in terms of legal certainty – the section devoted to the “legal 
characterization” of abusive rebate should thus be disregarded, because it lacks substantive 
authority.115 
E. SUMMATION 
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To recapitulate, two options exist.  Some may consider that the Intel judgment can be 
formally and substantively disregarded for the assessment of abusive conduct post 2009.  In 
this context, the Guidance Paper remains formally and substantively applicable, and the 
debate on its substantive applicability will have to be settled by the Court in the context of 
other proceedings. 116  Others may find Intel authoritative, and pluck in it some hints on the 
positive law of dominant firms’ exclusivity rebates.  In this variant, a modified per se 
prohibition rule applies to exclusivity rebates.  And this standard only covers a subset of 
practices, ie leveraging rebates.  Other rebates shall be subject to the rule of reason, in line 
with the “more economic”, effects-based spirit of the Guidance Paper. 
III. INTEL AND THE GOALS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 
A. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The Intel court consistently repudiates the need to establish actual or likely anticompetitive 
effects in exclusivity rebates cases.   That position tells as much in relation to evidence than it 
says on the goals of abuse of dominance.  With this, the Intel court whispers that the 
prohibition rule of Article 102 TFEU does not aim at remedying anticompetitive outcomes, in 
the form of market exclusion.  This strays from the “effects-based” philosophy advocated in 
the Guidance Paper.  And even more fundamentally, this seems to dismiss the relevance of 
the “outcome” paradigm in EU abuse of dominance law.  The outcome paradigm – also 
known as the “welfarist”, “output” or “efficiency” paradigm – can be traced to the Chicago 
school, and in particular to the works of Robert BORK and Richard POSNER.  It is 
controversial.  Professor Eleanor FOX wrote once that “it is a crabbed perspective that [is] 
intended to and does minimize antitrust law”.117  
Instead, the Court inks out that the basic concern undergirding Article 102 TFEU is to ensure 
that rivals’ “access to the market” (or supply to customers) is not made “more difficult”, and 
this regardless of whether rivals are or not foreclosed.118  This is repeated at least two dozen 
times in the judgment.119   
In practice, the idea that it is abusive for a dominant firm to make rivals’ access “more 
difficult” is challenging.  For instance, monopoly pricing is what makes rivals’ life the least 
difficult.  Should the monopoly price thus be the lawful pricing point for the dominant firm 
enjoined to end abusive rebates?  
It is not those practicalities that we want to discuss here.  Rather, building on the early 
scholarship that reads in Intel a plain rejection of any outcome-related goal in Article 102 
TFEU law, our intention is to elicit what alternative, non-outcome goal(s) lurks behind the 
slogan that rivals’ access be not made more difficult. 120   Like in the US where a rich 
theological debate has arisen due to Congress’s reluctance to articulate the goals of the 
Sherman Act, the EU Treaties have never clearly explicated the goals of the competition 
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rules.  And the Intel court’s pronouncements to the effect that competitive outcome is not the 
lynchpin of Article 102 TFEU, is not accompanied by the explicit formulation of an alternate 
non-outcome paradigm. 
We may approach the topic by reviewing what the antitrust literature has to say about non-
outcome goals. In this perspective, the idea that Article 102 TFEU seeks to prevent rivals’ 
from being made “more difficult” can be tied to three distinct theoretical goals, which have 
been fiercely discussed in US antitrust scholarship.  We describe and debate all three goals, 
their merits and flaws, with a view to assess their possible acclimation in the EU competition 
law order.  As will be seen, none of them seems importable in the EU legal and economic 
system.  And none of them wears away the necessity to apply economics in the decision 
making process.  
B. COMPETITIVE PROCESS 
The first goal possibly attributable to Article 102 TFEU is the protection of the “competitive 
process”.  Though it is nowhere mentioned in the Intel judgment, there is good reason to 
discuss it first.  Professor FOX rightly describes the competitive process as the polar opposite 
of the outcome paradigm that dominates contemporary US antitrust policy and the Guidance 
Paper.121  So if the postulate is right that Intel strays from the Guidance Paper’s spirit, it is 
logical to start with a review of its antithesis.  In addition, the bare language of Intel alludes to 
concepts like the “structure of competition”, “market access” or competition on the “merits” 
which are often viewed as corollaries of the competitive process.  Eleanor FOX herself uses 
interchangeably notions such as “process-and-access approach”, “competitive structure”, 
“openness of the market”, “rivalry”, etc.  Lastly, senior members of the EU Commission legal 
service – the finest experts of EU statutory interpretation – have often contented in public that 
the Court’s case-law on Article 102 TFEU seeks to protect the competitive process.122   
Let us thus explore the ramifications of the “competitive process” goal.  Professor FOX has 
advanced the following description of the paradigm: 
“Maintaining an environment congenial to mavericks and upstarts; an environment that 
induces firms to be rivalrous, to seek new ways to reduce their own costs, and to vie to meet 
buyers’ wants. A task of antitrust is to prevent this dynamic process from being undermined. 
Therefore, preserving access by outsiders, preserving contestability of markets, and at high 
levels of concentration, valuing diversity, are seen as mechanisms of efficiency. Preventing 
inefficient outcomes is also an objective, but safeguarding the process is the first-line 
protector against bad outcomes”.123 
In FOX’s view, the competitive process should be protected as a first-order objective, because 
it reins in the risk of anticompetitive outcomes.   
Wouter WILS, a former member of the Legal Service, and also a backer of the competitive 
process paradigm, has developed a distinct interpretation.124  In his view, the competitive 
process should not be protected because of the belief that it delivers positive results in terms 
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of consumer welfare.  Rather, the competitive process must be protected for its own sake.  
WILS’ argument rests on Austrian economics theory, and in particular on the works of 
Friedrich HAYEK who viewed competition “as a procedure for the discovery of such facts 
as, without resort to it, would not be known by anyone, or at least would not be utilise”. 125  
Accordingly, WILS finds no place for “welfarist”, outcome, or output considerations in 
Article 102 TFEU enforcement.   
In an undeservedly discrete paper,126  Professors Aaron EDLIN and Joe FARRELL have 
attempted to reconcile the welfarist and non-welfarist readers of the competitive process.127  
EDLIN and FARRELL are also supporters of the competitive process paradigm.128  Their 
ambition is to articulate a formalised definition of the competitive process, noting that 
“Courts … frequently stress the competitive process, even when they may not be particularly 
clear about what that process is”. 129   
At a stylised level, EDLIN and FARRELL define the competitive process as “the process of 
sellers and buyers forming improving coalitions”.  In mundane words, it is the “freedom to 
strike better deals”.  If firm A is inefficient, customers should remain free to trade with B at 
their mutual betterment.  This dynamic process implies a form of creative destruction, 
reminiscent of the Schumpeterian tradition.   
In addition, EDLIN and FARRELL introduce an outcome, welfarist or efficiency dimension 
in their definition.  In their view, an economy subject to the competitive process evolves 
towards an optimum labelled the “core”, which corresponds to the set of all allocations that 
leaves no coalition of traders in a position to improve the payoffs of all its members.130  
Alternately put, the core is a Pareto efficient outcome.   
In their paper, EDLIN and FARRELL proceed to build a theory of harm to the competitive 
process in a single firm conduct context.  The baseline is that a “monopoly may not block 
improving trade between customers and rivals who would offer customers a better deal”.  In a 
monopoly setting, this can however happen because rivals may have to compete against a 
virtual price lower than the actual price paid by the customers of the dominant firm.  To 
explain this, EDLIN and FARRELL propose the simple following model.  The monopolist M 
charges a high price H, but would cut it to a low price L in case of entry.  Rival(s) R knows L, 
and cannot compete at this level.  But R could offer a median price PM lower than H that 
would improve the situation of customers.  In spite of this, however, R will not enter, 
conjecturing retaliation at L.  Customers will be deprived of an improvement.  In the model, R 
compete with a virtual price lower than that actually charged to customers.131   
EDLIN and FARRELL concede a conceptual flaw in their model, notably that L represents an 
ex post improving coalition if entry occurs.132  But in our view, an even more fatal defect 
vitiates their model.  In real markets, there are only two possible states of the world.  In the 
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first state of the world – that imagined by EDLIN and FARRELL – R know L.  There is 
perfect (or quasi-perfect) information.  The reasons for this situation of informational 
perfection may be diverse: M may have disclosed L in the past during a previous anti-entry 
campaign; M may be subject to a regulatory duty (to disclose cost information, to 
approximate prices to cost, etc.); the product manufactured by M is a commodity, technology 
is mature, etc.; M has explicitly threatened R from L through press announcements, etc.  The 
bottom line is that in all these cases, there is market transparency on L.  With this in mind, it 
should be equally, and safely, assumed that customers are also aware of L (especially if they 
are experienced industrial customers).  This, in turn, has a critical implication: customers can 
and will first seek to form an improving coalition with M, and strike the best possible deal 
with it.  And if they do not get it,133 customers will turn to R who will give them L<PM<H.  
In both scenarios, there will be an improving coalition as to the real conditions of the market, 
and the competitive process will be kept intact. 
In the second state of the world, R do not know L.  There is imperfect information.  In this 
variant, it is common-sensical to assume that R must randomly under or overestimate L.  The 
unconfident R will overestimate L (L’<L).  They will not enter the market.  And the confident 
R will underestimate L (L’’>L).  They will thus not compete against the real L, but against a 
price they believe they can beat, and that is lower than H.  The confident R will again enter 
the market, and offer better coalitions to customers. 
EDLIN and FARRELL’s model of virtual limit pricing is thus fictional.  Moreover, we are 
not convinced by the suggestion that it is superior to other liability standards, an in particular 
to outcome/output ones, because antitrust agencies will not wrestle with complex price-costs. 
This is indeed an incongruous argument, for with this definition, antitrust agencies are 
conducted to wrestle with ghost prices. 
Their paper further seeks to bring conceptualization by advancing novel concepts such as 
“price patterns” in lieu of “price levels” or the idea that M can “move the goalposts” by 
threatening R to compete against lower prices to win customers, than those that prevail in the 
actual market.  In fairness, one fails to see what this has to offer to the analysis, beyond sleek, 
eye-catching jargon.  
EDLIN and FARRELL’s paper makes a number of important points though.  In particular, 
their paper usefully irons out the caricatured presentation that in a competitive process 
paradigm, economics shall no longer inform antitrust enforcement.  The competitive process 
concept bodes very well with the policy trend that consists in applying a “more economic” 
approach in abuse cases (though the Guidance Paper was more “outcome” spirited).  If Article 
102 TFEU is ever approached as a prohibition on dominant firms to thwart the formation of 
improving coalitions between their rival and customers, then it will not dispense the EU 
agencies and courts from bringing economic evidence of such coalitions, and from measuring 
the various payoffs in question.  
But the main obstacle to the acclimation of the “competitive process” as the goal of Article 
102 TFEU does not lie in economists’ difficulties to operationalize the notion of the 
competitive process.  Rather, it is the language of the EU Treaties that displays repulse to the 
idea that the competitive process can be the goal of Article 102 TFEU.  The prohibition of 
abuses couched in the Treaties focuses on conduct that imposes welfare decreasing outcomes 
on the market: “unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions”; 
“limiting production”; “applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions”, etc.  Such 
abuses do not distort the competitive process.  The Treaties’ interest for the outcome of 
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monopolists’ conduct suggests that the founding fathers did not purport to protect the 
competitive process.  This point was picked as early as 1970s by Professor JOLIET in a 
seminal essay, 134  which demonstrated that the text of Article 102 TFEU covered only 
exploitative abuses, such as excessive prices or output restrictions.  This was in contrast with 
the US antitrust context, where Congress did not prohibit high prices, but decided to ban 
restraints of trade or monopolization, thereby displaying more interest in the protection of the 
competitive process.  Surely, the EU upper court expanded in Continental Can the notion of 
abuse to exclusionary conduct and repeatedly held that the list of abuses found in Article 102 
TFEU was not exhaustive.  But judicial precedent is reversible.  And if we return to statutory 
language in search of the goals of EU antitrust law, Treaty support to the “competitive 
process” paradigm appears weak.   
WILS is of a distinct opinion.  In his view, the introduction in 2007 of a Protocol No 27 as 
Annex to the EU Treaties has refurbished the legal basis insufficiency that we just diagnosed.  
WILS asserts that “it is clear from Protocol No 27 on the internal market and competition, 
annexed to the Treaty of Lisbon, that the objective of Article 102 TFEU (and of the other EU 
competition rules) is a system of undistorted competition, as part of the internal market 
established by the EU”.  On this ground, WILS writes that the 2007 addition of Protocol no 
27 to the Treaty marks a clear endorsement of the competitive process as a goal for EU 
antitrust law.135  WILS thus considers that the debate in the scholarship over the objective of 
Article 102 TFEU is largely irrelevant.136  And given the quasi-constitutional nature of the 
2007 upgrade, WILS concludes that neither the Court of Justice, nor the Commission and 
Council have a say over the issue. 
Can things be all that simple?  Let us ignore for a minute the main weakness of the argument, 
and assume away that the notion of “system of undistorted competition” can be taken as a 
synonym of the “competitive process”.  WILS’ point misreads the genesis of the Lisbon 
Treaty in relation to competition law.  As most European readers know, Protocol No 27 has a 
convoluted legal history.  In 2007 in Lisbon, the Heads of State decided to suppress Article 3, 
§1, g) from the EU Treaties, which stated that “the activities of the Community shall include 
[...] a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”.  With this, the 
Heads of State sought to address the growing distrust in public opinion with free market 
policies – including antitrust – expressed in two failed referendums in France and the 
Netherlands.  In a sort of legal quid pro quo, however, the Heads of State decided to keep a 
discrete reference to “undistorted competition” in a Protocol annexed to the Treaty.  This 
Protocol has same legal value as the Treaty.  But in an annexed Protocol, the status of 
competition policy is given less symbolical prominence than in the first articles of the Treaty.   
The demotion of “undistorted competition” in a Protocol triggered a supernova of outcries in 
the antitrust industry.137  In Brussels, the talk of the town was that the Lisbon Treaty had 
downgraded the objective of undistorted competition in EU law.   
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In response to this, Michel PETITE, the former Director of the Legal Service made the 
following important rectification:  
“As a matter of fact, competition is not currently one of the objectives of the European 
Community set out in Article 2 of the EC Treaty: the reference to “undistorted competition” 
appears only in Article 3 on the Community activities to be implemented to attain those 
objectives. Clearly, an objective that does not exist cannot be lost!” 138 
In other words, under the pre-Lisbon Treaties, “undistorted competition” never was an 
objective of the EU.  Article 2 of the Treaty, which is the constitutional provision that hosted 
the EU’s objectives, made no single reference to undistorted competition.  Consequently, no 
objective had been suppressed, weakened or modified, by virtue of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty 
modification. 
The upshot of this analysis is that WILS cannot be right on the interpretation of Protocol no 
27.  The introduction of a Protocol seeking to make “undistorted competition” less obtrusive 
cannot, as he pretends, erect let alone create, an objective, a goal or purpose of undistorted 
competition in the EU legal order. 
In addition, WILS’ analysis is further riddled by two errors, known in logic as fallacies of 
unwarranted assumptions (implicit suppositions whose truth is either false or uncertain).  
First, Protocol No. 27 prescribes that “the internal market as set out in Article 3 of the Treaty 
on European Union includes a system ensuring that competition is not distorted”.  The text of 
Protocol No 27 talks of a “system” and not of an “objective” as WILS analogizes.  And those 
words cannot be assumed to mean the same thing.  At a conceptual level, a system can indeed 
have several objectives.  And an objective can run on several systems.   
A similar argument applies to the claim that Protocol No 27 protects the competitive process.  
The reference to the idea that “competition is not distorted” potentially encompasses outcome 
distortions as much as process distortions.  And one cannot assume arbitrarily that the Heads 
of State had process in mind, when they surgically transferred Article 3 1 g) in an Annex to 
the Treaties. 
With all this, there is no strong economic and legal support to the proposition that the 
competitive process is the lynchpin of Article 102 TFEU.  In particular, neither the language 
nor the spirit of the Treaty provide clear backing to this argument.  
B.  CONSUMER CHOICE 
A second possible non-outcome foundation for Article 102 TFEU is “consumer choice”.  In 
Intel, the Court observes on several occasions that Intel restricted its OEM’s “freedom of 
choice” of supplier.  It is thus worth exploring if “consumer choice” can be the raison d’être 
of Article 102 TFEU. 
1. State of the Art 
The proposition that consumer choice should be hailed as a goal of antitrust law is not new.  It 
has gained momentum in the past 20 years, with the growing influence of behavioural 
economics in public policy.  Neil AVERITT and Robert LANDE were amongst the firsts to 
vindicate its introduction in US antitrust policy, as an alternative to the dominant price and 
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efficiency standards. 139   According to AVERITT and LANDE, the antitrust prohibitions 
should “seek to eliminate practices which artificially restrict the choices the free market 
would otherwise have provided”.140   
AVERITT and LANDE have advanced two considerations to sell a shift to consumer choice 
standard.141  First, the consumer choice standard is more inclusive than others.  In particular, a 
consumer choice standard would better apprehend non-price competition dynamics than a 
price or efficiency standard.142   Under a price standard, a wide array of anticompetitive 
practices evade the kill switch of the antitrust prohibitions (for instance, an agreement to limit 
advertisement).  Those are captured by a consumer choice standard, thereby limiting type II 
errors.143  Second, the consumer choice standard has a series of “administrative advantages”: 
it facilitates convergence on the international antitrust scene; it creates synergies with other 
branches of the law such as consumer protection; and it explains simply to the public opinion 
why a system of competitive capitalism is good for consumers.144  
In Europe, the debate on the acceptability of consumer choice as a goal of antitrust is arguably 
far more mature, and less controversial, than in the US.145  AVERITT and LANDE consider 
that “some EU statements on competition policy are already framed in terms very similar to 
our proposed choice approach”.  Professor NIHOUL goes even further.  In his view, the law 
on abuse would already be based on consumer choice.  In a comprehensive paper, NIHOUL 
sustains that consumer choice is present “as a mechanism, in all Article 102 TFEU cases”.146  
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His analysis is based on a thorough lexical review of the Article 102 TFEU case-law, as well 
as of recent high profile cases, most notably France Telecom, Microsoft, and the Commission 
decision in Intel.147   
With this background, is it true that consumer choice is the positive goal of Article 102 TFEU 
– as argued by NIHOUL and others – and what does Intel tell us about it?  Unlike in the 
previous section, we start with a review of the legal arguments, and we then discuss some 
economic considerations.  
2. Legal Assessment 
The Treaty wording does not talk of consumer choice.  But Article 102 b) TFEU makes a 
discrete reference to conduct that limits production “to the prejudice of consumers”.  Unlike 
for the competitive process, there seems to be less Treaty obstacles to the accommodation of 
“consumer choice” as the goal of Article 102 TFEU. 
However, it is the case-law that defeats the proposition that consumer choice is the goal of 
Article 102 TFEU.  It is certainly true that in most EU judgments, and especially in Intel, 
consumer choice was relevant in the analysis.  But it is equally true that consumer choice was 
often – if not always – accompanied by a complementary concern: that by removing 
consumer choice, the dominant firm had restricted rivals’ market access.  In other words, 
restrictions on consumer choice have only been a problem in the case-law to the extent that 
they gave rise to an exclusionary effect.148  This means that consumer choice is not an end in 
itself.  At best, it is a contingent or ancillary paradigm.149   
Moreover, the idea that consumer choice may have been the dominant paradigm in the Article 
102 TFEU case-law considered in NIHOUL’s paper was disavowed in 2012 by the upper EU 
court.  In Post Danmark, a case concerning limit pricing practices, the Court affirmed that:  
“not every exclusionary effect is necessarily detrimental to competition. Competition on the 
merits may, by definition, lead to the departure from the market or the marginalisation of 
competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view of, 
among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation”.150 
With this statement, the Court implicitly ruled that consumers can end up with a single 
supplier, which marks the antithesis of consumer choice.151  In a single supplier scenario, 
buyers have no ability to “switch”, which constitutes the defining feature of “consumer 
choice”.  More fundamentally, Post Danmark embraces a Darwinian vision of economic 
competition which is conceptually irreconcilable with the consumer choice standard. 
3. Economic Assessment 
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We come now to the discussion of the economics of consumer choice.  In our view, basic 
monopoly theory trumps the recognition of consumer choice as a possible goal for Article 102 
TFEU.  In a market subject to a monopoly, the sole price level likely to improve consumer 
choice is the price level that triggers entry.  But economic theory explains that a true 
monopolist can charge the monopoly price without attracting competitive entry.  In the 
standard monopoly model, the sole price level that can thus draw new firms in the market – 
and ameliorate consumer choice – is a “supra monopoly” price.152  This, in itself, reveals the 
extravagant remedial implications of consumer choice as a policy goal.  Under a consumer 
choice paradigm, dominant firms should be required to keep prices above the monopoly level 
(or as high as possible), for this would stimulate entry and choice.  And they should be barred 
from tariffing below for this would discourage entry and choice.  This, clearly, cannot be the 
law.  
But there are other reasons against the recognition of consumer choice as the objective of 
Article 102 TFEU.  Amongst them, a crucial objection is that a consumer choice standard 
risks handicapping agencies in their fight against sophisticated exclusionary practices, like 
predatory marketing or product innovation strategies (assuming they exist).  In a much 
discussed paper published in the early 1980s, Janus ORDOVER and Robert WILLIG 
established that anticompetitive predation can occur in the form of “genuine innovations-new 
products that in some ways are superior to existing products in the eyes of both engineers and 
consumers”.153   In a consumer choice model where antitrust is to “protect any type of choice 
that is of practical importance to consumers”, should there be blanket Article 102 TFEU 
immunity for such practices? Is this what the consumer choice advocates have in mind when 
they argue that their paradigm is more inclusive? 
The traps of a consumer choice standard in Article 102 TFEU can be further envisioned in 
relation to commoditized products.  Take the example of a patent-expiring drug.  Under a 
consumer choice standard, the patent holder’s measures to delay or discourage generic entry 
would be complex to deem abusive.  In most circumstances, the business model of generic 
firms consists in duplicating the patent holder’s drugs.  This does not deliver a significant 
improvement in the choice provided to consumers.  Surely, consumers face a larger price 
menu following generic entry.  But in this case the consumer choice doctrine is useless.  
Agencies and complainants before courts seeking a finding of abuse only need to show that 
generic entry yields reduced prices, which improves consumer welfare.  Put differently, the 
detour by the consumer choice route brings little added value to an outcome paradigm focused 
on consumer welfare.  
Beyond those considerations, the economic foundations of consumer choice remain probably 
too shaky at this stage to be fit for antitrust embedment.154  In the modern economic literature 
behavioralists have – perhaps counter intentionally? – adjudicated against consumer choice as 
a possible antitrust goal, by showing that consumers make poor choices due to physiological, 
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cognitive and psychological limitations.155   In this context, why should antitrust regimes 
protect free choice by all means, if choice is so defective? In the alternative, why should 
antitrust correct deficient consumer choice, if all Member States of the EU have harmonized 
rules on unfair business to consumer (B2C) commercial practices and on consumer rights?156  
The efficacy and legitimacy of antitrust intrusion in areas subject to dedicated legislation 
remains to be proven.  Surely, there is a case for antitrust, when dominant firms fiddle with 
consumer choice to harm competitors or to usurp more consumer surplus than they could 
otherwise do.157  But this is not terra incognita for antitrust law.  Cases like Microsoft I and 
II, where the dominant software producer exploited consumer inertia to trounce competing 
media players and Internet browsers, amply show this.158 
C.  RAISING RIVALS’ COSTS 
The idea that a dominant firms abuses by making rivals’ access “more difficult” can finally be 
tied to the raising rivals’ costs theory (hereafter, “RRC theory”).  The genesis of RRC theory 
can be traced to a conference hosted by the US Federal Trade Commission (“TFC”) in June 
1980.  The conference centred on how to approach non price predation in monopolization 
cases following US v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.159 In its famous 1957 ruling, the US 
Supreme Court had restricted the availability of non-price predation claims under Section II 
of the Sherman Act. 
The conference failed to come up with a grand unifying answer.  But it prompted more 
research.  In 1983, Steven SALOP and David SCHEFFMAN – then economist with the FTC 
– published an article with the American Economic Review entitled “Raising Rivals’ Costs”, 
which paved the way to the formation of a rich body of literature often referred to as the 
“RRC papers”.160  In antitrust scholarship, RRC theory was vigorously criticized.  Some went 
as far as to call it a “fable”.161  Its influence on antitrust enforcement remained marginal until 
the mid-1990s, when it gained some traction with the rise of Post Chicago economics. 
The RRC framework is not strictly about “making access to the market more difficult for a 
competitor” as aired out in Intel.  It is about something close: making rival production more 
difficult through inflated costs.  RRC theory pretends that a dominant firm can induce rivals 
to exit, not only by sacrificing its own profits as in the classic predatory pricing scenario, but 
                                                          
155
  Individuals do not always behave rationally, seeking to maximize profits, as industrial theorists posit.  They 
cannot – and do not – collect, process and analyze all the information necessary to make cost-benefit analysis. 
Individuals exhibit features such as “bounded rationality”, “bounded willpower”, and “bounded self-interest”. 
The first of these terms refers to the fact that people have “cognitive quirks that prevent them from processing 
information rationally”; the second that they exhibit weakness of will; and the last refers to the fact that people 
“sometimes act out of motives that do not seem explicable by self-interest”. See R. POSNER, “Rational Choice, 
Behavioral Economics, and the Law”, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 50, No 5, 1998, 1551. See Posner, R. Rational 
Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law. Stanford Law Review, Vol. 50, No 5, 1998, 1551; M. STUCKE, 
“Money, Is That What I Want?: Competition Policy and the Role of Behavioral Economics”, Santa Clara 
Law Review, 50, 2010, p. 101. 
156
 Directive 2005/29/EC, OJ L 149, 11.6.2005, p. 22; Directive 2011/83/EU, OJ L 304/64, p. 64. 
157
 See P. MARSDEN, who advances the idea that antitrust law should ensure that firms do not manipulate the 
“exercise of choice” (JECLAP, "Exercising choice" 
http://m.jeclap.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/10/15/jeclap.lpu095, accessed 11 May 2015) 
158
 N. PETIT and N. NEYRINCK, “Back to Microsoft I and II: Tying and the Art of Secret Magic”, Journal of 
European Competition Law & Practice, 2011, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 117. 
159
 United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). 
160
 S. SALOP and D. SCHEFFMAN, 'Raising rivals' costs', American Economic Review 73, 267–71. 
161
 See J. E. LOPATKA and P. E. GODEK, “Another Look at Alcoa: Raising Rivals' Costs Does Not Improve 
the View”, Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Oct., 1992), pp. 311-329, as reprinted in D. 
SPULBER (Ed.), Famous Fables of Economics: Myths of Market Failures, Wiley, 2001. 
 33 
also by imposing cost increases on rivals with the purpose or effect of raising their prices (or 
reducing their output).  The underlying mechanism is simple.  A dominant firm can influence 
the supply curve of an elastic fringe firm by raising its costs.  With inflated costs, the 
reservation price at which the fringe firm will be ready to serve customers will increase, and it 
will produce less (it will chose a price higher on its supply curve).  The demand left 
unsatisfied by the fringe supplier will then turn to the dominant firm, whose residual demand 
curve will shift out.   And the dominant firm can use the increased price of the fringe firm as a 
sort of price umbrella. 
Importantly, the dominant firm does not need to deprive rivals of profitability.  According to 
RRC theory, there can be antitrust liability even if the competitor remains profitable.  As 
SALOP explains “successful RCC does not require the exit of rivals or even the permanent 
reduction in competitors’ production capacity. If the marginal costs of established 
competitors are raised, those rivals will have the incentive to raise prices and reduce output, 
even if they remain viable”. 162   This appears in contrast with the outcome-based tests 
previously discussed, where the emphasis is on the economic unviability of a hypothetically 
as efficient rival. 
Moreover, whilst RRC theory certainly finds antitrust liability if the cost increase only targets 
the rival (for instance, the dominant firm convinces the Government to introduce a ban of 
certain rivals’ products), it also applies when the “cost increase imposed on rivals has a 
similar effect on the instigator” (for instance, an advertisement campaign).  In those cases, the 
dominant firm may have an incentive to increase in its own costs, “if it can raise the market 
price at the current level of output by more than [it] raises its average costs”.163   
It is not our purpose here to discuss at length the pros and cons of RRC theory.  But we would 
like to recall several important points.  First, whilst RRC theory certainly looks “process” 
oriented at the formulation level – and therefore Intel-compatible – it remains deeply 
“outcome”-loaded at the testing level.  SALOP and SCHEFFMAN recall the three necessary 
conditions for a finding of antitrust liability: profitability to the dominant firm, competitor 
injury, and consumer welfare reduction.164   With distinct words, KRATTENMAKER and 
SALOP make a similar point: “a firm that raises its rival’s costs has not necessarily gained 
anything. It may have harmed one or more of its competitors, but has it harmed 
competition?”.165  In spite of appearances, RRC theory thus fares poorly with the process-
inspired wording of Intel.  In contrast, it is more attune to the outcome based-spirit of the 
Treaty wording and of the Guidance Paper. 
Second, RRC theory is based on the textbook economic model of dominant firm price 
leadership.  In this model, the dominant firm competes with a fringe of rivals.  A constant 
assumption of the model – that is often not explicated in the RRC policy papers – is that the 
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dominant firm has lower costs than smaller rivals.166  More specifically, RRC theory takes the 
fringe firms’ supply curve as a proxy for rivals’ incremental costs, and this curve is 
systematically above the dominant firm’s average costs curve.  This has important 
implications for EU antitrust law.  To start, the transplantation of the RRC paradigm in 
Article 102 TFEU law would require the explicit admission that abuse occurs when conduct 
harms less efficient rivals.  In positive law, this is more the exception than the rule, though the 
Guidance Paper recognizes this possibility.167  In turn, RRC theory does not clearly explain 
the consequences to be attached to conduct that targets as (or more) efficient rivals.  Should 
such cases be dismissed, if the dominant firm can prove that rivals are equally (or more) 
efficient? Or should they be pursued, because conduct that harms equally (or more efficient) 
rivals necessarily harms (in equilibrium) less efficient potential competitors?   
In addition, the RRC framework is not easy to reconcile with the European theory of liability 
that rivals’ “access to the market” is abusively made “more difficult” by the dominant firm.  
Indeed, in the RRC model, rivals’ access to the market is presumptively made “more difficult” 
by the wealth of efficiencies associated with the dominant position – which is lawful – and by 
the small-scale inefficiencies of the fringe firms.  The upshot of this is that the “more 
difficult” position of rivals is not exogenously caused by the dominant firm conduct, but 
already pre-exists endogenously in the model.  Under an RRC standard, insuperable causation 
problems would thus come to the surface, when trying to distinguish the contribution of the 
dominant position from that of the impugned abuse to the “more difficult” market access of 
rivals.   
Third, and possibly more importantly, the application of the RRC model is liable to be 
voracious in terms of enforcement resources, a point to which agencies are likely to be very 
sensible as aptly noted by WILS.168  The concrete implementation of a RRC paradigm will 
consume a vast amount of quantitative economic data, in particular in relation to supply and 
demand side elasticities, costs, etc. 169  In addition, the RRC framework commands to resolve 
complex methodological questions at early stages of the antitrust investigation.  In terms of 
enforcement costs, the RRC paradigm may thus prove almost as expensive as the outcome 
paradigm allegedly derided in Intel. 
CONCLUSION 
The positive law conclusion from all the above is that Intel sets a modified per se prohibition 
standard for exclusivity rebates that strays from Hoffmann-La Roche.  This prohibition applies 
to exclusivity options that operate through leveraging.  In contrast, non-leveraging rebates are 
subject to a rule of reason standard.  Moreover, the Intel court’s judgment does not nullify the 
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substantive, “more economic” framework set out in the Commission’s Guidance Paper, and 
could not possibly so, given the lack of formal applicability of this official document in the 
case.  On the contrary, the Intel court affirms the justifiability defense introduced in this 
document, and subsequently confirmed by the CJEU in Post Danmark.  Finally, the case-law 
analyzis provided by the Intel court in support of its reasoning is on the whole very weak and 
riddled with disconcerting inconsistencies.  It may not be strong enough to carry the case. 
Assuming that it is right to read in Intel the consecration of a non-outcome (or non-welfarist) 
goal for Article 102 TFEU, the prospective law conclusion from our analysis is that none of 
the alternative standards, ie process, consumer choice, or RRC advanced in the literature seem 
apt to become the objective of Article 102 TFEU. 
With this background, let us close this essay with a reference to Nobel Prize economist 
Friedrich HAYEK, who has often been cited in the early Intel papers.170  If HAYEK was still 
alive, he would plausibly commend EU antitrust lawyers.  The competition for ideas that has 
arisen in academic journals since Intel is a lively illustration of his 1978 theory of 
Competition as a Discovery Procedure.171  Most likely, intellectual competition will assist the 
CJEU in discovering the right legal solution, and bring to a closing outcome this important 
positive and prospective debate.   
Also, if Friedrich HAYEK was still with us, he would certainly invite antitrust lawyers to 
rediscover his previous 1946 article The Meaning of Competition.172  This paper, which has 
been absent from the early Intel scholarship, articulates a conception of market competition 
that both philosophically and semantically contains the efficiency, consumer harm, and 
dynamic competition ingredients found in the Commission’s “more economic”, effects-based 
approach to Article 102 TFEU (advocated in the Guidance Paper, and endorsed by the CJEU 
in Post Danmark).  Let us quote HAYEK: 
“Much more serious than the fact that prices may not correspond to marginal cost is the fact 
that, with an entrenched monopoly, costs are likely to be much higher than necessary.  A 
monopoly based on superior efficiency, on the other hand, does comparatively little harm so 
long as it is assured that it will disappear as soon as anyone else becomes more efficient in 
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